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Abstract
In many countries elderly workers are subject to a double distortion when they consider
prolonging their activity: the payroll tax and a reduction in their pension rights. It is
often argued that such a double burden would not be socially desirable. We consider a
setting where it would be rejected by both a utilitarian and a Rawlsian social planner.
Furthermore, each individual would also reject it as a citizen candidate. We show that
the double burden may nevertheless be (second-best) Pareto efficient and can be sup-
ported by a particular structure of social weights biased towards the more productive
workers.
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1 Introduction
One of the most striking developments of the last fifty years is the trend toward earlier
retirement. Clearly one of the factors driving this trend is the long term increase in
economic wealth which permits workers to enjoy rising living standards, even as they
spend a growing fraction of their lives outside of the workforce. Another important
factor of earlier retirement is the expansion of social protection programs which induce
workers to stop working long before the standard age and surely the age at which they
would retire in the absence of these programs. A number of studies (see, e.g., Gruber
and Wise (1999) or Blondal and Scarpetta (1998)) have shown that early retirement
is encouraged not only by special provisions of the old age system itself, but also by
unemployment related transfer schemes, disability insurance or special early retirement
schemes which are available to workers well before the early retirement age of 60 in most
countries.
Altogether these programs make prolonging activity a costly decision because it
implies paying additional payroll taxes and also declining pension rights.1 This is what
is usually called the double burden of postponing retirement, the first burden being
explicit and the second implicit. Interestingly, this second implicit burden varies across
countries; see e.g., Gruber and Wise (1999) and Blondal and Scarpetta (1998). It is very
important in Belgium and France and very low in Sweden and Japan. Observe that early
retirement is very costly in terms of productive resources. As shown by Herbertson and
Orszag (2001) its cost amounts to about 7% of GDP in the OECD countries. It also
represents a threat to the financial viability of pay-as-you-go systems for it exacerbates
the problems raised by the demographic trend (slower population growth and longer life
expectancy). Consequently, an increase in effective retirement age via an elimination
(or mitigation) of the double burden is often advocated. Yet, such reform often appear
to be unpopular and have to face a stiff political resistance.
The question one might raise at this point is: why was early retirement introduced in
the first place? Standard answers to that question pertain to labor market considerations
1Total pension rights decrease when continued activity translates into an increase in per-period
payments (if any) which is less than actuarially fair.
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such as the need to foster employment of jobless youth, the problem raised by old
workers with wages much above their productivity or firms in difficulty laying off their
aged employees; see e.g. Conde-Ruiz and Galasso (2003).
These are surely reasonable explanations at least for some countries. One would
like however to see whether or not early retirement policy could possibly be supported
by some type of political majority in a setting where the labor market considerations
mentioned above do not matter. Put differently, can there be some political support for
the inducement of early retirement which is motivated solely by the inherent features
of retirement insurance and specifically its redistributive properties? This is the issue
we deal with in this paper by studying the impact of early retirement on the lifetime
utility of individuals with different productivities.
We consider a setting where an implicit tax on continued activity would be rejected
by both a utilitarian and a Rawlsian social planner. Furthermore, each individual would
also reject it as a citizen candidate. We show that the double burden may nevertheless be
(second-best) Pareto efficient and can be supported by a particular structure of social
weights biased towards the more productive workers. Consequently, it could emerge
from the political process as long this process implies that sufficient weight is put on
the more productive workers. Similarly, a reform towards a more neutral system may
not be supported by the political process.
2 The model
Consider a society with workers of productivity wi, i = 1, 2, . . . , n, where w1 < w2 <
. . . < wn. The number of type i workers is Ni, the total number of workers is N and the
proportion of type i workers is λi = Ni/N . The length of life is normalized at 1. The
individual labor supply, which represents the length of the working period (number of
years spent working), is denoted zi. It is interpreted as the retirement age. The utility
function is:
U (d, z) = u (d− h (z)) (1)
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where d is total consumption and h (z) is the disutility of work; u (.) is increasing and
concave: u0 > 0, u00 < 0 and h (.) is increasing and convex: h0 > 0, h00 > 0. In the
remainder of the paper we denote the consumption net of the disutility of labor by c =
d− h (z).
Total consumption is given by
d = w (1− τ) z + p− αz,
where τ is the payroll tax rate of the Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) pension system. It cor-
responds to the explicit tax on continued activity. The implicit tax is represented by
the parameter α. Total pension wealth is given by p − αz; when α > 0, it decreases
as the individual decides to retire later. This means that there is implicit taxation on
continued activity. The payroll tax rate is assumed to lie between 0 and 1: τ ∈ [0, 1].
Negative values of α are allowed. In such a case, individuals are induced to work longer.
We can write the previous expression as:
d = y (1− θ) + p,
where θ = τ + α/w is the marginal tax rate on continued activity and y = wz is life
cycle income. Observe that p does not depend on productivity levels.
The optimal retirement decision of an individual with productivity w is given by the
first-order condition
w (1− θ)− h0 (z) = 0. (2)
In what follows, we adopt a specific form for the disutility of labor: h (z) = γz2/2. This
yields the following labor supply function:
z =
w (1− θ)
γ
=
w (1− τ)− α
γ
. (3)
Substituting this expression into (1) and taking into account the government budget
constraint,
p = αz + τy,
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where z and y denote average labor supply and income respectively, we obtain the
indirect utility function
V (τ , α;w) = u
·
(w(1− τ)− α)2
2γ
+ α
w(1− τ)− α
γ
+ τ
E(w2)(1− τ)− αw
γ
¸
. (4)
In the remainder of the paper we shall assume that this function is quasi-concave. This
means that the upper contour sets of V in the (τ , α) plane are convex. Appendix A
shows that w(w − 2w1) < E(w2) − w2, where E(w2) − w2 > 0 is the variance of w, is
a sufficient condition for this to hold for all levels of w. It is satisfied in a trivial way
when w1 ≥ w2/2 (as in the numerical used in the proof of Proposition 3 below). The
condition holds whatever the level of w1 when (E(w2)− w2)/w2 ≥ 1, that is when the
distribution of productivities involves a sufficient degree of heterogeneity (the coefficient
of variation exceeds one).
3 Individually optimal policies
In this section, we describe the individuals’ most preferred policies (τ , α, p) . This in-
dividual optimum is defined in the usual way. The policy, when applied to the entire
society, maximizes the considered individual’s welfare. Interestingly, the most preferred
policies of all individuals (whatever their level of productivity) involve a negative level
of α. Consequently, no individual is in favor of an implicit tax. Everyone prefers that
pensions rights p − αz do not decrease with z. This point is stated in the following
proposition.
Proposition 1 The most preferred policy of all the individuals, whatever their level of
productivity, involves α < 0.
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Proof. We evaluate ∂V/∂α (with V given by (4)) at the point τ = τ∗ (0), α = 0. The
optimal value of τ is the solution of the first order condition
∂V
∂τ
=
·
−y + y + αdz
dτ
+ τ
dy
dτ
¸
u0 (c) = 0
⇔
"
E
¡
w2
¢
(1− 2τ)− w2 (1− τ) + αw − 2αw
γ
#
u0 (c) = 0
⇔ τ∗ (α) =
E
¡
w2
¢
− w2 + α (w − 2w)
2E (w2)− w2 .
At α = 0, this yields
τ∗ (0) =
E
¡
w2
¢
− w2
2E (w2)− w2 .
This is positive if and only if w <
p
E (w2).
The derivative of the indirect utility function with respect to α is
∂V
∂α
=
·
−z + z + α dz
dα
+ τ
dy
dα
¸
u0 (c)
=
·
w (1− 2τ)− w (1− τ)− α
γ
¸
u0 (c) .
For individuals with productivity below
p
E (w2), we obtain
∂V
∂α
¯¯¯¯
α=0
=
"
w
Ã
1− 2
E
¡
w2
¢
− w2
2E (w2)− w2
!
− w
Ã
1−
E
¡
w2
¢
− w2
2E (w2)− w2
!#
u0 (c)
=
"
w
w2
2E (w2)− w2 − w
E
¡
w2
¢
2E (w2)− w2
#
u0 (c)
> 0 ⇔ w >
E
¡
w2
¢
w
.
From Jensen’s inequality w <
p
E (w2). Therefore E
¡
w2
¢
/w is larger than
p
E(w2).
This leads to the conclusion that the individuals with productivity below
p
E (w2) want
a negative α.
For individuals with productivity above
p
E (w2),
∂V
∂α
¯¯¯¯
α=0
=
·
w −w
γ
¸
u0 (c)
> 0 ⇔ w < w.
Because
p
E (w2) > w, high productivity individuals also want a negative α.
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To understand the intuition behind this result let us first look at the low productivity
workers (those with w <
p
E(w2)), who prefer a negative α (an implicit subsidy) in
order to induce high productivity individuals to work hard and then tax away their labor
income through a relatively high level of τ . To be more precise, while both instruments,
τ and α, induce some redistribution from the high-skilled to the low-skilled individuals,
it turns out that τ is the more “powerful” instrument. A positive τ generates some
redistribution from the individuals with a high labor income (wz) to the individuals
with a low income. This appears clearly when evaluating ∂V/∂τ at the point τ = 0,
α = 0:
∂V
∂τ
¯¯¯¯
τ=0,α=0
= (y − y)u
0(c)
γ
= (E(w2)− w2)u
0(c)
γ
.
On the other hand a positive α redistributes from the aged workers to the early retirees:
∂V
∂α
¯¯¯¯
τ=0,α=0
= (z − z)u
0(c)
γ
= (w − w)u
0(c)
γ
. (5)
Because labor supply is increasing with productivity (see (3)), this results also in some
redistribution from high to low productivity individuals. By comparing the two expres-
sions above, one can see that τ is a more “powerful” redistributive instrument than α:
for w < E(w2), ∂V/∂τ |τ=0,α=0 > ∂V/∂α|τ=0,α=0. A positive τ is then for the poor a
more effective instrument than α to achieve the desired redistribution.
From a poor individual’s perspective, a positive α may thus be desirable only for
efficiency reasons: it could be a means to limit tax distortions (e.g., if the productive
would have a higher labor supply elasticity). However with a quadratic disutility of labor
the elasticity of labor supply with respect to the net wage is constant: it is the same
for the rich and the poor:
∂z
∂w(1− θ)
w(1− θ)
z
= 1.
Therefore the efficiency argument that could lead to a positive α chosen by the poor is
not relevant in our setting.
Let us now turn to the high productivity workers who also prefer a negative α, but
for different reasons, namely because they face a (binding) constraint on τ . If they could
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set a negative τ , they would opt for this solution.2 Because τ is restricted to be non-
negative, setting a negative α is the only way for them to get a favorable redistribution.
This is because a negative α redistributes income from the early retirees (who are the
low skill individuals) to the aged workers (the high skills).
We have thus shown that all the workers including those with the lowest productivity
would vote against a positive α. In other words, the Rawlsian criterion, or any other
welfare criterion or political process which puts all the weight on a single individual
implies α 6 0. Let us now turn to the utilitarian criterion.
4 The utilitarian optimum
As above, we restrict the instruments to be linear with identical rates applying to all
individuals. The utilitarian optimum is then obtained by solving.
max
τ,α
SW =
nX
i=1
λiV (τ , α;wi) .
Recall that p is implicit as a third policy instrument but that the government budget
constraint is already incorporated in the indirect utility function.
Proposition 2 The utilitarian optimum implies a negative level of α.
Proof. We first show that the optimal utilitarian tax rate at α = 0, τu (0), is positive:
∂SW
∂τ
¯¯¯¯
τ=0,α=0
> 0
⇔
nX
i=1
λi
£
E
¡
w2
¢
− w2i
¤
u0 (ci (0, 0)) > 0.
Denote by k the first productivity level such that E
¡
w2
¢
−w2 < 0, that is E
¡
w2
¢
−w2i <
0 iff i ≥ k. Observing that ci (0, 0) = w2i /2γ, we have that u0 (ci (0, 0)) is decreasing with
i. Therefore λi
£
E
¡
w2
¢
− w2i
¤
u0 (ci (0, 0)) > λi
£
E
¡
w2
¢
− w2i
¤
u0 (ck (0, 0)), ∀i 6= k. This
implies
nX
i=1
λi
£
E
¡
w2
¢
− w2i
¤
u0 (ci (0, 0)) >
nX
i=1
λi
£
E
¡
w2
¢
− w2i
¤
u0 (ck (0, 0)) = 0.
2This would be equivalent to introducing a poll tax (because p = τy < 0) and redistributing the
proceeds proportionally to income.
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We then write the first-order condition that determines the optimal value of τ at α = 0.
∂SW
∂τ
¯¯¯¯
α=0
= 0 (6)
⇔
nX
i=1
λi[E
¡
w2
¢
(1− 2τu (0))− w2i (1− τu (0))]u0 (ci (τu (0) , 0)) = 0.
We now evaluate the marginal impact of α on the utilitarian social welfare at α = 0:
∂SW
∂α
¯¯¯¯
α=0
=
nX
i=1
λi [w (1− 2τu (0))− wi (1− τu (0))]u0 (ci) .
This is positive if and only if
E
¡
w2
¢
w
∂SW
∂α
¯¯¯¯
¯
α=0
> 0 (7)
⇔
nX
i=1
λi[E
¡
w2
¢
(1− 2τu (0))−
wiE
¡
w2
¢
w
(1− τu (0))]u0 (ci) > 0
⇔
nX
i=1
λi[w
2
i −
wiE
¡
w2
¢
w
]u0 (ci) > 0,
where we have used (6).
The remainder of the proof follows along the same lines. Denote by k the lowest
productivity level for which w2i − wiE
¡
w2
¢
/w > 0; to be more precise k is such that
w2i − wiE
¡
w2
¢
/w > 0 iff i ≥ k. Observing that λi[w2i − wiE
¡
w2
¢
/w]u0 (ci (0, 0)) <
λi[w2i − wiE
¡
w2
¢
/w]u0 (ck (0, 0)), ∀i 6= k, and summing, we obtain:
nX
i=1
λi[w
2
i −
wiE
¡
w2
¢
w
]u0 (ci (0, 0)) <
nX
i=1
λi[w
2
i −
wiE
¡
w2
¢
w
]u0 (ck (0, 0)) = 0.
It follows that
E
¡
w2
¢
w
∂SW
∂α
¯¯¯¯
¯
α=0
< 0,
so that one cannot have αu > 0.
This proposition says that a utilitarian planner does not want to introduce an im-
plicit tax. The reasons underlying this result are very similar to those discussed in the
Rawlsian case. As the argument in the proof makes clear, this result is indeed driven
by the fact that the marginal utility is decreasing with productivity. Consequently,
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the utilitarian planner will have a greater concern for the welfare of the poor. From
a redistributive point of view, choosing a positive α is harmful, because it means set-
ting a marginal tax rate higher for low income individuals than for high income ones.
Consequently, a positive level of α could be justified only by efficiency considerations.
However, as pointed out before, with constant elasticity of labor supply, there is no
reason to differentiate marginal tax rates between individuals (via a positive level of α).
Summing up, there is no reason to introduce an implicit tax.
5 Political outcomes
At this point the case for a positive α is quite weak. Consider the weighted sum of
individual utilities
WS =
X
βi V (τ , α,wi) (8)
where βi are non negative weights such that
P
βi = 1. We have seen that
∂WS
∂α
¯¯¯¯
τ∗>0,α=0
< 0
for βi = λi (utilitarian objective) and βi = 1 for any i with βj = 0 with j 6= i. Does that
mean that we cannot find any profile of βi such that the above inequality be reversed?
If this were the case, it would mean that α > 0 can be Pareto efficient. Moreover,
interpreting the βi’s as political weights, it would mean that α > 0 can be the outcome
of some political process giving these particular weights to the different productivity
groups.3 If V (·) had just one argument, such an outcome would not be possible. However
we have to remember that low productivity individuals want a positive τ and a negative
α whereas the high productivity ones want also a negative α and they would like a
negative τ but this is not possible. In other words, given this constraint on τ , it is not
impossible that with appropriate weights α > 0 and τ > 0 converge as a solution. The
idea underlying this result is that the implicit tax is the result of a compromise: whereas
a low tax rate is chosen so as to favor the highly productive workers, the policy maker
3This is a reduced form of the so-called probabilistic voting model, developed by Coughlin and Nitzan
(1981) and further elaborated by Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) and Dixit and Londregan (1996). An
application of this model to retirement policies can be found in Profeta (2002).
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chooses a positive value of α in order to compensate the low productive workers. The
political power of the former must be large, but not too large. Indeed, we have shown
in the first section that, should all the political weight be given the most productive
individuals, they would choose an implicit subsidy rather than an implicit tax.
Sufficient conditions for α to be positive are that the optimal tax rate evaluated at
α = 0, denoted τp (0), is positive and that the impact on WS of marginally increasing
α at this point is also positive. Formally:
∂WS
∂τ
¯¯¯¯
τ=0,α=0
> 0
⇔
nX
i=1
βi[E
¡
w2
¢
− w2i ]u0 (ci (0, 0)) > 0. (9)
and
∂WS
∂α
¯¯¯¯
τ=τp(0),α=0
> 0
⇔
nX
i=1
βi [w (1− 2τp (0))− wi (1− τp (0))]u0 (ci (τp (0) , 0)) > 0. (10)
Using the first-order condition on τp (0):
nX
i=1
βi[E
¡
w2
¢
(1− 2τp (0))− w2i (1− τp (0))]u0 (ci (τp (0) , 0)) = 0, (11)
the second condition (10) becomes
nX
i=1
βi[
wi
w
E
¡
w2
¢
−w2i ]u0 (ci (τp (0) , 0)) < 0. (12)
In the appendix we prove that condition (10) cannot be satisfied with only two
productivity classes. When there are more than two levels of productivity, we now show
that αp > 0 is possible.
Proposition 3 With three productivity levels, there may exist weights β1, β2 and β3
such that the outcome of the political process is an implicit tax on continued activity:
αp > 0.
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Proof. To prove this result, we rely on a numerical example. The utility function
is iso-elastic: u (x) = x1−ε/(1 − ε), with ε = 0.95. Productivity levels are w1 = 20,
w2 = 50, w3 = 80 and γ = 90, λ1 = λ2 = λ3 = 1/3. In such a setting, we obtain that
with weights β1 = 0.1, β2 = 0.2 and β3 = 0.7, conditions (9) and (12) are satisfied; the
function WS is maximized at τ = 0.042 and α = 0.249.4
This proposition shows that for some social weights a double burden on postponed
retirement can be desirable. In this example the social weights are biased towards
workers with high productivity. These workers would like τ to be negative. But τ is
constrained to be non negative and workers with lower productivity would instead ask
for a positive τ . The solution we obtain is a compromise biased towards the more
productive workers. The tax rate is higher than what they want, but much lower than
that asked by the less productive workers. In counterpart they have to stand a positive
value of α, which, relatively speaking, favors the less productive workers. As explained
in section 3, α is second best instrument for the poor to redistribute income; when τ is
restricted to being small, the poor may prefer to set a positive α (see (5)).
One may wonder why such a compromise is not possible when there are only two
types. The formal proof in the Appendix is quite intricate. Roughly speaking the crucial
point is that with only two types the policy that maximizes WS switches directly from
τ > 0, α < 0 to τ = 0, α < 0 when the power of the rich is increased, without passing
through the region τ ≥ 0, α > 0. In other words there not sufficiently “degrees of
freedom” to obtain the result described in Proposition 3.
The practical relevance of our result hinges of course on the plausibility of a political
process biased towards the “rich”. While there is admittedly no definitive answer to
this issue, there is some evidence that the political process in western democracies may
effectively yield such a bias. For instance, Bénabou (2004) argues that “poor and less
educated individuals have a lower propensity to register, turn out to vote and give
political contributions, than better-off ones. [...] Even for political activities that are
time- rather than money-intensive, such as writing to congress, attending meetings,
4The considered distribution of productivities yields w = 50 and E(w2) = 3100. Consequently we
have 2w(w − w1) = 3000 < E(w2) = 3100, so that (13), the sufficient condition for quasi-concavity is
satisfied.
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trying to convince others, etc., the propensity to participate rises sharply with income
and education.” An empirical study of political weights is provided by Bartels (2002)
who uses surveys to determine the differential responsiveness of U.S. senators to the
preferences of rich and poor constituents. He shows that “In every instance, senators
appear to be much more responsive to the opinions of affluent constituents than to the
opinions of constituents with modest incomes. On average, [. . . ] the 75th percentile of
the income distribution have almost three times as much influence on senators’ general
voting patterns as those at the 25th percentile [. . . ]. The preferences of constituents
near the top of the income distribution are even more influential, while those in the
bottom fifth receive little or no weight, especially from Republican senators.” Summing
up, it appears fair to say that the case with a large political power for the rich seems
to be more than just a theoretical curiosity.
6 Conclusion
The question raised by this paper is whether or not the double burden imposed on
elderly workers when they consider postponing retirement can be Pareto efficient and
result from some political process. Such a double burden is effectively observed in a
number of European countries. The answer is positive which is striking as such a double
burden would be consistently rejected by any citizen candidate and by a utilitarian (or
Rawlsian) criterion.
We realize that other explanation can be used to justify such a policy which results
in a very low rate of labor participation among elderly workers. For instance there are
the labor market considerations mentioned in the introduction. To obtain crisper results
we have deliberately ignored these aspects. The factors we account for can thus only
tell part of the story. However, they may well offer an explanation for the persistence of
early retirement at a time when its impact on youth unemployment has been severely
questioned; see e.g. Boldrin et al. (1999).
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Appendix
A Quasi-concavity of the indirect utility: sufficient condi-
tions
The indirect utility function specified by (4) is quasi-concave if
D1 =
¯¯¯¯
0 ∂V/∂τ
∂V/∂τ ∂2V/∂τ2
¯¯¯¯
< 0
and
D2 =
¯¯¯¯
¯¯ 0 ∂V/∂τ ∂V/∂α∂V/∂τ ∂2V/∂τ2 ∂2V/∂τ∂α
∂V/∂α ∂2V/∂τ∂α ∂2V/∂α2
¯¯¯¯
¯¯ > 0.
The first condition is always satisfied. Turning to the second condition we successively
obtain:
D2 = −
∂V
∂τ
¯¯¯¯
∂V/∂τ ∂V/∂α
∂2V/∂τ∂α ∂2V/∂α2
¯¯¯¯
+
∂V
∂α
¯¯¯¯
∂V/∂τ ∂V/∂α
∂2V/∂τ2 ∂2V/∂τ∂α
¯¯¯¯
= −
µ
∂V
∂τ
¶2
∂2V
∂α2
−−
µ
∂V
∂α
¶2
∂2V
∂τ2
+ 2
∂V
∂α
∂V
∂τ
∂2V
∂τ∂α
=
u0(c)3
γ3
[A2 +B2(2E(w2) + w2) + 2AB(w − 2w)]
where
A = E
¡
w2
¢
(1− 2τ)− w2 (1− τ) + αw − 2αw
B = w (1− 2τ)−w (1− τ)− α.
This expression is positive if
A2 +B2(2E(w2) +w2) + 2AB(w − 2w) > 0
⇔ Φ ≡
µ
B
A
¶2
(2E(w2) +w2) +
B
A
2(w − 2w) + 1 > 0.
We solve for the quadratic equation Φ = 0:
∆ = b2 − 4ac
= 4(w − 2w)2 − 4(2E(w2) + w2)
< 0 ⇔ 2w(w − w) < E(w2), (13)
which is the condition stated in Section 2.
B The case of two productivity levels
We show that with only two productivity levels, w1 < w2, the maximization of (8)
always implies αp < 0 (whatever the weights λi). We proceed in two steps
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Step 1: With two types, condition (10) is
β1 [w (1− 2τp (0))−w1 (1− τp (0))]u0 (c1 (τp (0) , 0))
+ β2 [w (1− 2τp (0))−w2 (1− τp (0))]u0 (c2 (τp (0) , 0)) > 0
⇔
β1
β2
> −w (1− 2τ
p (0))− w2 (1− τp (0))
w (1− 2τp (0))− w1 (1− τp (0))
u0 (c2 (τp (0) , 0))
u0 (c1 (τp (0) , 0))
.
From (11),
β1
β2
= −
E
¡
w2
¢
(1− 2τp (0))− w22 (1− τp (0))
E (w2) (1− 2τp (0))− w21 (1− τp (0))
u0 (c2 (τp (0) , 0))
u0 (c1 (τp (0) , 0))
.
The previous condition then becomes
−
E
¡
w2
¢
(1− 2τp (0))− w22 (1− τp (0))
E (w2) (1− 2τp (0))− w21 (1− τp (0))| {z }
ϕ(τp(0))
> −w (1− 2τ
p (0))− w2 (1− τp (0))
w (1− 2τp (0))− w1 (1− τp (0))| {z }
ψ(τp(0))
. (14)
We prove now that this inequality can never be satisfied. To do this we make use of the
following expression which are easily obtained from (14)
lim
τ→
³
w−w1
2w−w1
´− ψ (τ) = +∞; lim
τ→
µ
E(w2)−w21
2E(w2)−w21
¶− ϕ (τ) = +∞;
w − w1
2w − w1
<
E
¡
w2
¢
− w21
2E (w2)− w21
;
τp (0) <
E
¡
w2
¢
− w21
2E (w2)− w21
.
From these expression we show that ϕ (0) = ψ (0) = λ1/λ2 and ψ0 (0) > ϕ0 (0):
ψ0 (0) =
w (w2 − w1)
(w − w1)2
> ϕ0 (0) =
E
¡
w2
¢ ¡
w22 − w21
¢¡
E (w2)− w21
¢2
⇔ w1 + w2 >
E
¡
w2
¢
w
.
Observing that E
¡
w2
¢
< w2w, this inequality is always satisfied.
Step 2: To complete the proof, it remains to show that αp evaluated at τ = 0 is
negative. This case needs to be analyzed when τp (0) < 0 (in the case τp (0) ≥ 0, the
constraint on τ is not binding), that is when
∂WS
∂τ
¯¯¯¯
τ=0,α=0
< 0
⇔ β1
β2
< −
E
¡
w2
¢
− w22
E (w2)−w21
u0 (c2 (0, 0))
u0 (c1 (0, 0))
.
14
We argue that one cannot have αp positive. This would be the case if
∂WS
∂α
¯¯¯¯
τ=0,α=0
> 0
⇔
2X
i=1
βi (w − wi)u0 (ci (0, 0)) > 0
⇔ β1
β2
> −w − w2
w − w1
u0 (c2 (0, 0))
u0 (c1 (0, 0))
.
Observing that
−
E
¡
w2
¢
− w22
E (w2)− w21
= −w − w2
w − w1
=
λ1
λ2
,
we can conclude that the two conditions on β1/β2 are not compatible and thus that it
cannot be the case that αp (0) > 0.
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